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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard W Kriebel asserts that the district court erred summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. Mr. Kriebel asserts that Estrada1 announced a new rule and it 
should be retroactively applied to him. The matter should be remanded for further 
proceedings applying the rule announced in Estrada because Mr. Kriebel presented a 
material issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the statute of 
limitation should be tolled allowing Mr. Kriebel to file a late petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On September 2, 2005, the district court imposed a twenty-five year sentence, 
with ten years fixed, following Mr. Kriebel's conviction for lewd conduct with a child 
under sixteen years old. (R., p.3.) Mr. Kriebel's conviction became final on October 14, 
2005.2 (R., p.3.) Mr. Kriebel filed this post-conviction petition two years after the 
original Judgment of Conviction was lodged by the district court. (R., pp.3-7.) 
In his petition, Mr. Kriebel asserted that the district court ordered a psychosexual 
evaluation of the petitioner in the underlying criminal case pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 18-8316 and Idaho Criminal Rule 32. (R., p.4.) Mr. Kriebel averred that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to 
suppress the psychosexual evaluation. (R., p.5.) Mr. Kriebel explained that the 
evaluation contained a number of unfavorable and derogatory comments about the 
1 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
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petitioner including potential for future dangerous. (R., p.4.) Mr. Kriebel claimed that he 
would have received a more favorable sentence had his attorney suppressed the 
unfavorable report. (R., p.5.) 
Mr. Kriebel asserted that his claim was based upon a change in the law 
announced in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). (R., p.4.) He 
requested that the psychosexual evaluation be removed from the record and that his 
case be remanded to the district court for resentencing. (R., p.5.) 
Upon receiving Mr. Kriebel's request for appointment of an attorney, the district 
court appointed counsel. (R., p.21.) Shortly thereafter, the State moved for summary 
disposition. (R., pp.22-23.) The State submitted a brief in support of its request. 
(R., pp.24-29.) The State argued that Mr. Kriebel's petition was untimely because the 
action was not filed before October 13, 2006.3 (R., pp.24-29.) Additionally, the State 
argued that Mr. Kriebel's claims were conclusory and lacked evidence.4 (R., pp.24-29.) 
In response, Mr. Kriebel explained that he was incarcerated in the State of 
Washington from September through December 2005. (R., p.36.) After returning to 
Idaho, in early 2006, Mr. Kriebel wrote a letter to trial counsel requesting a post-
conviction petition. (R., p.36.) Mr. Kriebel's attorney implied that there was no basis for 
2 Mr. Kriebel did not appeal his original conviction. (R., p.3B.) Therefore, his conviction 
became final October 14, 2005, 42 days after the Judgment of Conviction was entered 
which was on September 2, 2005. (R., p.41.) 
3 The State does not utilize the date that the Judgment of Conviction was lodged by the 
district court, but instead, the date the district court orally pronounced the sentence. 
4 Mr. Kriebel requested that the merits not be ruled upon until after the issues of 
timeliness and waiver were ruled upon by the court. (R., p.38.) The district court did 
not reach the merits of the state's argument that Mr. Kriebel's claims were conclusory 
and lacked evidence. (R., pp.44-61.) Mr. Kriebel asserts that he did present a material 
issue of fact, but the primary issue before this Court is the timeliness of Mr. Kriebel's 
petition. 
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post-conviction relief. (R., p.36.) In a letter to Mr. Kriebel dated January 9, 2006, trial 
counsel indicated that the two had previous discussions about his rights after the 
conviction was entered. (Letter to Kriebel dated January 9, 2006,5 hereinafter 
Augment.) In the letter, the attorney states, that Mr. Kriebel's "evaluation was not as 
favorable as it could have been and that presented some major problems." (Augment.) 
Additionally, the attorney had memorialized previous discussion regarding pending 
actions and whether Mr. Kriebel's case was closed. (Augment.) The attorney 
concluded that "At this point I do not see a lot of options." (Augment.) The attorney 
never informed Mr. Kriebel that he could file a post-conviction petition in reference to the 
derogatory psychosexual evaluation. (Augment.) 
Upon learning about the Estrada case, Mr. Kriebel discovered that he had the 
right to remain silent during the tests and meetings with the psychosexual evaluator. 
(R., p.36.) Mr. Kriebel explained that he made a number of statements because he did 
not know that he could refuse to cooperate with the evaluator. (R., p.36.) The 
evaluation contained a number of derogatory statements. (R., pp.36-37.) Mr. Kriebel 
recalled the sentencing judge making comments about his psychosexual evaluation. 
(R., pp.36-37.) 
Additionally, Mr. Kriebel argued that his claims were timely and not waived. 
(R., pp.38-42.) Mr. Kriebel argued that Estrada announced a new rule and, therefore, 
the time period to file the post-conviction petition was tolled. (R., pp.38-42.) 
5 Mr. Kriebel has filed a Motion to Augment the January 9, 2006 Letter to Kriebel. The 
Court has yet to rule on the motion. 
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The district court granted the State's motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.44-
61.) The district court concluded that the time to file Mr. Kriebel's post-conviction 
petition was not equitably tolled based on a lack of access to the courts or trial counsel's 
advice. (R., pp.44-61.) Additionally, the Court found that Estrada did not announce a 
new rule of law. (R., pp.44-61.) Assuming even if the rule announced was new, the 
district court concluded that it would not be retroactively applied. (R., pp.44-61.) 
Mr. Kriebel timely appealed. (R., pp.64-67.) 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err when it granted the State's motion for summary dismissal 
because it erroneously decided that Estrada should not be retroactively applied 
to Mr. Kriebel? 
2) Should the statute of limitations to file a post-conviction petition be tolled in 
Mr. Krieger's case because he was denied due process of law as a result of the 
new rule announced in Estrada, his limited access to Idaho resources, and his 
trial attorney's discouraging advice on filing a petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Because It Erroneously Determined That Estrada Should Not Be Retroactively Applied 
To Mr. Kriebel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kriebel asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-
conviction petition. Mr. Kriebel asserts that Estrada announced a new rule of law and it 
should be retroactively applied to him. Mr. Kriebel presented a material issue of fact 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advice 
him that he had the right to not participate in the psychosexual evaluation and/or the 
right to remain silent during the course of the evaluation. The matter should be 
remanded for further proceedings applying the rule announced in Estrada. 
B. Under A Teague Analysis The District Court Erred When It Failed To 
Retroactively Apply The Estrada Rule To Mr. Kriebel's Case 
Generally, new constitutional rules will not be applied retroactively to cases 
already final on direct review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). The United 
States Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the general rule. Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007). In collateral proceedings, 
substantive rules and watershed rules are applied retroactively. Shriro v. Summerlin, 
542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). 
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1. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Find That Estrada Announced 
A New Rule Of Law 
Determining whether a rule of law is new is not always easily determined nor has 
the spectrum of rules which may be new, been fully defined. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
In an attempt to give guidance on determining if a rule is new, the United States 
Supreme Court has attempted to define what is meant by a new rule. When precedent 
is being overruled, for example, a new rule is established. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 
(1990). The Court has also held that, "a case announces a new rule when it breaks 
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Additionally, a rule is considered new when it is "not 'dictated 
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."' Whorton, 
549 U.S. at_, 127 S. Ct. at 1181 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). 
To determine if a new rule of law applies under Teague, a reviewing court must 
first ascertain the date on which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final. 
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). Thereafter, the reviewing Court should 
survey the legal landscape as it existed at that time and determine if existing precedent 
required the new rule that is announced rule under the Constitution. Id. 
Mr. Kriebel's conviction became final on October 14, 2005. He asserts that the 
Estrada rule was not specified at the time his case became final. 
a. Estrada Announced A New Rule Because It Changed Precedent 
The district court erred when it determined that Estrada did not announce a new 
rule of law because Estrada overruled existing Idaho precedent. Therefore, Estrada 
announced a new rule. 
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Prior to 2006, in Idaho there was no right to counsel when participating in a court 
ordered psychosexual evaluation because it was not declared a critical stage of the 
proceedings. State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 144-45, 44 P .3d 1193, 1199-1200 
(Ct. App. 2002). In reaching its holding, the Curless Court noted the distinction between 
the standard sentencing cases and capital cases involving bifurcated jury proceedings. 
Id. The Curless Court recognized that when read together Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 
454 (1981) and Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) prohibited compelling a 
defendant to participate in a psychological evaluation if the defendant's statements 
could be used against him at a sentencing hearing in noncapital case. Id. In denying 
the defendant's claim that he was denied the right to counsel, the Court relied on Ninth 
Circuit precedent Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 576 (9th Cir. 1982) and 
Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2001). Id. The two cases made 
distinctions between capital and noncapital cases. Id. The Court concluded that a 
psychosexual evaluation was more akin to a presentence investigation than a 
psychological evaluation. Id. Thereafter, the Curless Court held that a "psychosexual 
evaluation did not constitute a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada fails to mention Curless. See generally 
Estrada. The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada relied on Estelle, supra, and United 
Sates v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) to conclude that participating in a psychosexual 
evaluation is a critical stage of the proceedings. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 
P.3d at 837-38. The Estrada Court's analysis substantially differed with the Curless 
Court's analysis in that Estrada concluded that a psychosexual evaluation is more akin 
to a psychological evaluation than a routine presentence report. Id. at 562, 149 P.3d at 
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837. Therefore, a defendant has at least a right to the advice of counsel on whether to 
submit to the exam. Id. at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38. 
Mr. Kriebel's conviction became final on October 14, 2005. Prior to Estrada, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that participating in a psychosexual evaluation was not a 
critical stage in the proceedings and, therefore, a defendant was not entitled to counsel. 
Curless, 137 Idaho at 145, 44 P.3d at 1200. Mr. Kriebel's case was, therefore, 
controlled by Curless. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992) 
(new principles of law announced by the Court of Appeals become precedential law of 
the state). In 2006, the Idaho Supreme Court changed Idaho's precedent holding for 
the first time that a defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding the 
decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual exam because it is a critical stage of 
the proceedings. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562-63, 149 P.3d 833, 837-38 
(2006). Because Estrada overruled precedent it should be deemed a new rule. 
b. Alternatively. Estrada Announced A New Rule Because It Broke 
New Ground And/Or Was Not Dictated By Precedent Existing At 
The Time Mr. Kriebel's Conviction Became Final 
As stated above, a rule is considered new when it is "not 'dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.'" Whorton v. Bockting, 549 
U.S. 406, _, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181 (2007) (emphasis in the original) (citations 
omitted). "A 'new rule' is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new 
rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of 
the new rule." Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008). The Supreme 
Court has recognized that difficulties will "arise in attempting 'to determine whether a 
particular decision has really announced a 'new' rule at all or whether it has simply 
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applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely 
analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law."' 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (citations omitted). 
Teague articulated two ends of the spectrum when providing guidance to the 
meaning of a "new rule." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. On one end of the spectrum is 
whether the rule breaks new ground and on the other end is whether the rule is not 
dictated by precedent. Id. While "breaking new ground" narrowly defines when a rule is 
considered new, the "not dictated by precedent" more broadly defines the phrase "new 
rule". 
In the instant case, the rule announced in Estrada is ground breaking because it 
is the first of its kind. Prior to Estrada, no other case had held that a person is entitled 
to the advice of counsel as it related to the participation during a psychosexual 
evaluation. While case law existed that would indicate a person would be entitled to the 
advice of counsel during a "psychological" evaluation, there was no case law that a 
person was likewise entitled to an attorney during a "psychosexual" evaluation. Estrada 
announced for the first time that a psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage in the 
proceedings and, therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies. Therefore, 
under the standard that the rule breaks new ground, this Court should find that the rule 
announced in Estrada is new. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the rule announced in Estrada should be 
considered a "new rule" because the rule was not dictated by precedent existing at the 
time of Mr. Kriebel's conviction. As Estrada itself recognized there existed no precedent 
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holding that a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applied to psychosexual 
evaluations. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. The Estrada Court stated: 
While no Idaho Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court case has 
specifically articulated a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
as it applies to psychosexual evaluations that may support a harsher 
sentence in a non-capital case, the case law nevertheless indicates that 
the Fifth Amendment applies to psychosexual evaluations. We affirm the 
district court's conclusion that Estrada's attorney was deficient in failing to 
inform his client of this right. 
Id. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. 
Additionally at that time, Idaho law required participation in a psychosexual 
evaluation if the district court ordered one. Idaho Code section 18-8316 provides in 
part, "If ordered by the court, an offender convicted of any offense listed in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code, shall submit to an evaluation ... for the court's consideration prior to 
sentencing and incarceration or release on probation." I.C. § 18-8316 (emphasis 
added). Thus, even if there was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the time 
Mr. Kriebel's case proceeded to sentencing, the attorney had no legal authority to tell 
Mr. Kriebel to not participate. The law required Mr. Kriebel's participation by the use of 
the term "shall" contained in the statute. Implicitly, the Estrada case ruled that the 
statute was unconstitutional. 
Therefore, in light of the statute requiring participation in psychosexual 
evaluations, if ordered, no other law declaring that there existed a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in reference to the evaluation, and no other case law dictated the 
Estrada Court's holding, this Court should deem that Estrada announced a new rule. 
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2. The Rule Announced In Estrada Is A Watershed Rule 
In collateral proceedings, new rules that are either substantive rules or watershed 
rules should be retroactively applied. Shriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). A 
substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the 
law punishes. Id. at 353. Procedural rules are those that regulate the manner of 
determining the defendant's culpability. Id. The rule involved in this case is a 
procedural watershed rule and, therefore, should be applied retroactively. 
Watershed rules implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal 
proceedings. Saff/e v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). The denial of the right to 
counsel at trial has generally been cited as an example of a watershed type of rule 
implicating the necessity of retroactivity. Id. Since Teague, the United States Supreme 
Court has yet to hold that a new rule satisfies the requirements for watershed status. 
Whorton, 549 U.S. at_, 127 S. Ct. at 1182. However, prior to Teague, the United 
States Supreme Court required retroactivity for a number of Gideon6-type violation. See 
Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968) (retroactively applying White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) which held that a defendant has the right to counsel at 
plea hearings); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1968) (retroactively applying 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) holding a defendant has the right to counsel at 
probation revocation hearings); McConnell, 393 U.S. at 3 (holding that the right to 
counsel on appeal recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) should be 
applied retroactively). 
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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The rule involved in this case does not affect the accuracy of the conviction; 
however, it is a Gideon-type violation that the United States Supreme Court has 
traditionally applied retroactively. Mr. Kriebel alleged that he was ordered to participate 
in a psychosexual evaluation. Participation in the psychosexual evaluation is a critical 
stage of the proceedings. Thus, he was entitled to at least the advice of counsel 
pursuant to Estrada. The denial of counsel in Mr. Kriebel's case was a Gideon-type 
violation. Therefore, this Court should find that it is a watershed rule requiring 
retroactivity. 
C. Under Idaho's Retroactivity Laws The District Court Erred When It Failed To 
Apply The Rule Announced In Estrada To Mr. Kriebel 
State courts are free to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure 
than required under Teague. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008). 
Therefore, Idaho may retroactively apply Estrada regardless of whether it would be 
required by the United States Supreme Court. Two variations of state retroactivity law 
are available and would lead to the same result: retroactivity of the Estrada decision to 
cases that were already final on appeal at the time the decision was announced. 
The first state retroactivity doctrine is that set forth in Matter of Gafford, in which 
the Idaho Supreme Court announced that a "new rule will be applied on collateral 
review if it requires the observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty."' Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 476, 903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995). The right to counsel is a 
fundamental right. Having this fundamental right to counsel during a psychosexual 
evaluation is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. A sentence issued upon the 
13 
denial of counsel is contrary to our constitutional protections. Therefore, to protect 
citizen's liberty interest, retroactive application under Gafford is appropriate. 
The second available retroactivity doctrine more lenient than Teague is the three-
prong test this Court articulated in a 1975 criminal case for determining whether a 
decision should be retroactively applied. See State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 491, 531 
P.2d 579, 581 (1975). Whether the new law should be applied retroactively is a 
discretionary determination of judicial policy made by the Court after balancing certain 
factors. Id. at 491, 531 P.2d at 581. The three factors are as follows: 
1) The purpose of the new rule; 
2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and 
3) The effect of the new rule on the administration of justice. 
Id. Those factors are the same as that identified in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965). Not only has Idaho used this test in the criminal setting, but it also has utilized 
this test in the civil setting. See Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 
(1974) (determining whether to apply the unconstitutional guest statute retroactively). 
Utilizing Idaho's retroactivity test, the rule announced in Estrada should be applied to 
Mr. Kriebel. 
The purpose of the new rule is to ensure that one's constitutional rights are not 
violated when one is court ordered to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. Under 
the law existing prior to Estrada, a defendant did not have a choice on whether to 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation once it was ordered by the district court. Idaho 
Code section 18-8316 provides in part, "If ordered by the court, an offender convicted of 
any offense listed in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall submit to an evaluation ... for 
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the court's consideration prior to sentencing and incarceration or release on probation." 
J.C. § 18-8316. In Estrada, the Court recognized that a presentence investigation was 
different than a psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. 
One of the differences the Court recognized was that a person is not statutorily required 
to participate in a presentence investigation, but is statutorily required to participate in a 
psychosexual evaluation, if ordered by the court. Id. The Estrada Court never held that 
the statute was unconstitutional, but its holding that a person may refuse to participate 
in light of the statue leads to such a conclusion. Thus, Estrada significantly changed the 
mandatory cooperation requirement of the statute, holding tthat one need not 
participate, regardless of the court's order. 
Applying Estrada retroactively does not complicate past reliance on prior 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. As stated above, neither the Idaho Supreme 
Court nor the United States Supreme Court had held that a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel existed in relation to the psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, retroactively 
applying the rule does not diminish reliance on past case law, as no Idaho Supreme 
Court case law existed on the issue. 
Retroactively applying Estrada would have little effect on the administration of 
justice. The error committed in this case does not involve guilt. The conviction itself 
would stand. There would not be a massive exodus from the prisons by the retroactive 
application of the rule. Mr. Kriebel, however, would need to be resentenced if he were 
successful at the evidentiary hearing proving that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Additionally, retroactively applying the Estrada rule would only impact a 
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handful of cases. The time to file an Estrada claim has now passed7 and the handful of 
appeals taken from the denial of the post-conviction petition are already been 
underway. Therefore, allowing the rule for retroactivity would correct a substantial 
constitutional law violation while not significantly impacting Idaho's judicial system. 
D. Mr. Kriebel's Post-Conviction Petition Should Be Reinstated And The Matter 
Remanded Applying Estrada To His Claims 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in 
nature. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827,830,452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992)). The Goodwin Court continued that, "[s]ummary dismissal 
of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary 
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628 (citations 
omitted). "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance 
of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." 
Id. Moreover, "[a]n application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an 
ordinary civil action, however, an application must contain much more than 'a short and 
plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)." 
Id. The Goodwin Court noted that, "an application for post-conviction relief must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
7 The Estrada case was finalized when the United States Supreme Court denied the 
petition for writ of certiorari on October 1, 2007. 
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application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the 
application." Id. at 271-72, 61 P.3d at 628-29 (citation omitted). "In other words, the 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Id. at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief either pursuant to a motion of a party or on the district court's own 
initiative. State v. Martinez, 130 Idaho 530, 532, 944 P.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(citations omitted). "Summary dismissal is proper only when the evidence presents no 
genuine issues of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle 
the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted." Id. (citation omitted). Summary dismissal of an 
application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate even if the State "does not 
controvert the applicant's evidence because the Court is not required to accept either 
the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629 (citations 
omitted). 
The appellate court will exercise free review of the district court's application of 
the relevant law to the facts. Ne/Isch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 
(Ct. App. 1992). The review of "a district court's construction and application of a 
statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), is a matter of free 
review." Evensioski v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
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On review of a summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition without an 
evidentiary hearing, the appellate court determines "whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party." Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
Mr. Kriebel asserts that he presented a material issue of fact. Specifically his trial 
attorney failed to advise him that he did not have to participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation or that he could exercise his right to remain silent. He then participated in 
the evaluation which contained derogatory information. The court relied on that 
information when imposing its sentence. The attorney's deficient performance caused 
the district court to impose a harsher sentence upon Mr. Kriebel. The district court 
failed to evaluate Mr. Kriebel's claims because it determined that Estrada should not be 
retroactively applied to him. 
E. Summary: Estrada Should Be Retroactively Applied To Mr. Kriebel's Case and 
The Matter Remanded For An Evidentiary Hearing 
Mr. Kriebel timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, filing it only one month 
after the Estrada case became final. Estrada announced a new rule and it should be 
retroactively applied to Mr. Kriebel either under the Teague analysis or under Idaho's 
retroactivity test. After determining that Estrada should be retroactively applied, 
Mr. Kriebel's case should be remanded for further proceedings because he presented a 
material issue of fact that his trial counsel failed to properly advise him about his rights 
to not participate in the psychosexual evaluation and/or his right to remain silent. 
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Mr. Kriebel presented significant evidence to proceed foiward to an evidentiary hearing 
that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him in that he received a harsher 
sentence due to the negative information provided in the psychosexual evaluation in 
which he participated. 
11. 
The Statute Of Limitations To File A Post-Conviction Petition Should Be Tolled In 
Mr. Krieger's Case Because He Was Denied Due Process Of Law 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kriebel asserts that the statute of limitation should be tolled. He had limited 
access to Idaho resources, his counsel discouraged him from filing a petition, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court announced a new rule in Estrada. Mr. Kriebel requests that this 
Court grant him equitable relief and toll the statute of limitations. 
B. The Statute Of Limitations To File A Post-Conviction Petition Should Be Tolled In 
Mr. Krieger's Case Because Of The New Rule Announced In Estrada, His 
Limited Access To Idaho Resources, And His Trial Attorney's Advise 
Mr. Kriebel seeks equitable relief and requests that this Court hold that the 
statute of limitations be tolled for him to file his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Mr. Kriebel asserts that due to the change in the law, his trial attorney's actions, and his 
limited access to Idaho resources he was denied due process of law under both the 
federal and state constitution. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, an application for post-conviction relief must be filed 
within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of 
an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is 
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later. I.C. § 19-4902; Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967, 969 
(2001). However, under some circumstances the statutory time limitation for filing a 
petition for post-conviction relief may be tolled. Idaho has recognized equitable tolling 
relating to post-conviction petitions in two circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was 
incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to Idaho legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or 
psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents the petitioner 
from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 
88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003). 
It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the 
courts for purposes of directly and collaterally challenging their convictions or 
sentences, or to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Drennon v. Hales, 138 
Idaho 850, 853, 70 P.3d 688, 691 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 
(1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); State v. Brandt, 135 Idaho 205, 207, 16 
P.3d 302, 304 (Ct. App. 2000); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 535, 944 P.2d 127, 
132 (Ct. App. 1997)). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ccess to courts is a 
fundamental right." Evensiosky, 136 Idaho at 191, 30 P.3d at 969 (citations omitted). 
"This right is grounded in the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United 
States Constitution." Drennon, 138 Idaho at 853, 70 P.3d at 691 (citing Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989)). Due process affords prisoners a limited right of 
access to the courts in order to challenge the legality of their convictions or the 
conditions of their confinement. Evensiosky, 136 Idaho at 191, 30 P.3d at 969; 
Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535, 944 P.2d at 132 (citations omitted). 
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In the instant case, Mr. Kriebel's petition for post-conviction relief should have 
been filed no later than October 14, 2006. During the statute of limitations time frame, 
Mr. Kriebel was housed in an out-of-state facility with no access to Idaho legal 
resources. {R., pp.36-37.) When he returned to Idaho and contacted his trial attorney, 
he was informed that he had no good prospects for filing a post-conviction petition. 
(R., pp.36-37.) However, this was erroneous in light of the future Estrada holding. 
Although Estrada was issued on November 24, 2006, it did not become final until the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 1, 2007. Mr. Kriebel 
contends that his attorney should not have discouraged him from filing a petition for 
post-conviction relief because he would have been able to receive the benefit of the 
Estrada case. Due to change in the law, his limited access to Idaho Courts, and his 
attorney's erroneous advise, Mr. Kriebel asserts that he was denied due process of law. 
Mr. Kriebel requests that this Court grant him equitable relief by tolling the statute of 
limitations and deem that his petition was timely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kriebel respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order 
Granting Motion for Summary Disposition and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
IA E M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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